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Brief sketches are given, on the one hand, of three "biological" accounts of human
language that construe its function in terms of evolutionary adaptation, and, on the other
hand, of three "theological" accounts of language that construe its function in terms of
human relatedness to God. The theological accounts, when placed into conversation with
the biological accounts, are allowed to raise specific critical questions and suggestions for
further work, in an attempt to contribute methodologically and materially to the ongoing
dialogue between science and religion.




terms of its abstract structure, interpersonal
dynamics, and sociopolitical implications
—
has been in this century a major focus of
philosophical and theological speculation is
an observation that hardly needs substantia-
tion. 1 Similarly, language as biology—as a
vividly developed and diversified aspect of
the functioning of the human organism,
embodied in its physical environment—has
been much studied in this century by cul-
tural anthropologists and psychologists and,
more recently, neurophysiologists and cog-
nitive scientists.- However, these vast realms
of research on language
—
philosophy and
theology (and related fields) on the one hand,
anthropology and neurobiology (and related
fields) on the other—have historically inter-
acted relatively little. Philosophers do not
often get involved in the "low-level" details
of how language is actually implemented in
"wet" human brains and varied cultural con-
texts. And biologists are not notably con-
cerned with arcane questions about the struc-
ture of meaning, the nature of representa-
tion, and the relation(s) between metaphor
and truth. There may have been, and may
still be, some good reasons for this "sepa-
rate but equal" policy. But the idea of inter-
disciplinary dialogue and exchange among
scientists, philosophers, and theologians, as
a fruitful way of sharpening conceptual and
observational tools and results on all sides,
seems increasingly worth considering and
testing rigorously. 3 An experiment in this
direction is my purpose in this paper. I will
sketch the contours of a more-or-less cur-
rent biological debate—on the role of natu-
ral selection in the evolution of the human
language capacity 4—and inquire how a
small sampling of more theologically in-
clined theories of language might interpret,
and in turn be interpreted by, the biological
debate.
Biological Considerations
The terms of the controversy are set out
with clarity by Steven Pinker and Paul
Bloom:
All modern students of language agree
that at least some aspects of language
are due to species-specific, task-specific
biological abilities.... It would be
natural, then, to expect everyone to
agree that human language is the
product of Darwinian natural selection.
The only successful account of the
origin of complex biological structure is
the theory of natural selection, the view
that the differential reproductive success
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associated with heritable variation is the
primary organizing force in the
evolution of organisms. . .. But,
surprisingly, this conclusion is contro-
versial. Noam Chomsky, the world's
best-known linguist, and Stephen Jay
Gould, the world's best-known evolu-
tionary theorist, have repeatedly
suggested that language may not be the
product of natural selection, but a side
effect of other evolutionary forces such
as an increase in overall brain size and
constraints of as yet unknown laws of
structure and growth....5
Any plausible account of the evolution
of human language must involve natural se-
lection as the primary mechanism, assert
Pinker and Bloom, because "natural selec-
tion is the only scientific explanation of
How is it that clumps of neurons and
trains of action potentials came to be (if
indeed they are) invested with the power
of representation, such that stable, shared
structures of association are somehow
manifested among three "systems":
world—brain—language?
adaptive complexity." 6 Language is adap-
tive and complex in that it is a "system com-
posed of many interacting parts" whose
"structure and arrangement suggest design
to fulfill some function" 7—a function that
has played a crucial role in the ability of the
human species to propagate itself and thus,
in turn, to ensure the continuing existence
and development of the biological (neural
and cultural) substrate of language. 8
To be classified as an adaptation, that
is, a product of natural selection, language
must satisfy two conditions. There must be
evidence that ( 1 ) "it has evolved (been modi-
fied during its evolutionary history) in spe-
cific ways to make it more effective in the
performance of [a particular] task," and that
(2) "the change has occurred due to the in-
creased fitness that results." 9 In other words,
if the capacity for language is due to natural
selection, then it must serve (or subserve) a
specific and recognizable task orfunction—
a function from which it must be possible to
draw implications concerning biological
advantage, that is, increased chances of sur-
vival and reproduction. But what is that
function? This is the heart of the debate.
Pinker and Bloom interpret Chomsky
and Gould as saying that language is not an
adaptation, because it has no "function" on
which selection can operate; instead, it arises
more or less epiphenomenally out of the
sheer complexity and computational power
of the human brain, which serves basically
as a general-purpose learning device (Gould)
i or—-whatever else it
may be doing—as a







by Pinker and Bloom
and many others, for
whom the only rea-
sonable perspective is
to see language as one among many "spe-
cialized biological systems, [all of which]
evolved by natural selection." l0
Yet the question of language's function
is an exceedingly complex one, in the dis-
cussion of which it seems impossible to iso-
late "scientific" from "philosophical" aspects.
The concept of "function" itself is by no
means neutral. "Any functioning structure
carries implicit information about the envi-
ronment in which its function 'works.'" "
This epistemological principle can be used
in reverse: One's construal of the environ-
ment in which a particular "function" works
influences decisively one's estimate of the
function itself, as will presently be seen. The
issue is made no easier by the fact that al-
most none of the neural underpinning for
language is understood in any real detail:
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at this point, what might be an important
constraint on speculation is simply a free
variable. 12
Why should it be that human beings
speak to one another, intelligibly and inces-
santly? What is language "used" for? The
answer may depend in part on what kinds
of "uses" seem important to the one answer-
ing. Is this something that can be empiri-
cally investigated? Some measure of the
matter's depth may be taken by consider-
ing some representative proposals (a few
out of many) for the biological function of
language.
Language as communication
Pinker and Bloom suggest, in what they
take to be an "entirely uncontroversial"
observation, that "language shows signs of
design for the communication ofproposi-
tional structures over a serial channel." I?
By "prepositional structures" they mean
groups of symbols that accomplish the iden-
tification, classification, and contextualiza-
tion of people (including beliefs, desires,
and behavior), objects, events, and their re-
lationships (including causation). Presum-
ably these "structures" involve interacting
references to multiple subjects and objects,
with attendant modifiers and predicates,
whose joint specification occurs in several
degrees of freedom. It is not immediately
obvious that these could effectively be
transmitted through an essentially one-di-
mensional ("serial") medium such as that
of the voice (and its correlate, the sense of
hearing). Yet this. Pinker and Bloom find,
is precisely what happens in spoken lan-
guage, and the design of language—in
terms of the "universal grammar" that un-
derlies all particular languages—shows
signs of its adaptation for the communica-
tion task subject to the given constraints.
Categories, rules, and structural transforma-
tions map the large parameter space with
which propositions deal to linear sequences
of symbols that are uttered and interpreted
according to a shared code. The evolution-
ary advantage of such communication is
"obvious":
By tapping into the vast reservoir of
knowledge accumulated by some other
individual, one can avoid having to
duplicate the possibly time-consuming
and dangerous trial-and-error process
that won that knowledge. 14
Pinker and Bloom have come under
criticism for their proposal's lack of con-
creteness when it comes to the process by
which language evolved. 15 They posit a
history of (vaguely defined) "intermediate
grammars," which were less complex or
consistent than today's evolved results, but
which provided the "bootstrapping" power
necessary for the gradual selection of full
human language. Bickerton requests de-
tails on what such "intermediate grammars"
would look like: which categories, rules,
or transformations could be impaired or
dropped from current grammars while leav-
ing a viable system or sequence of systems.
"Anything short of this is mere hand wav-
ing." I6 In the end. Pinker and Bloom give
impressive evidence for language's "com-
plexity" but can only speculate, and cast
doubt on rival ideas, on the matter of
language's "adaptation." Their construal
of language's function thus fails to contrib-
ute materially to their claim that language
arose by natural selection—and, con-
versely, the evolutionary evidence pertain-
ing to language provides an insufficient
perspective by which to discern its evolu-
tionary function.
Even more fundamentally, the question
of the evolution of the capacity for symbolic
representation itself in any form, including
that of speech, is left untouched by Pinker
and Bloom. How is it that clumps of neu-
rons and trains of action potentials came to
be (if indeed they are) invested with the
power of representation, such that stable,
shared structures of association are some-
how manifested among three "systems":
world—brain—language? 17
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Language as power
Is language uncontroversially a matter
of "transmitting prepositional structures,"
that is, communicating knowledge? Con-
troversy, or the lack of it, seems at least par-
tially to be in the eye of the beholder. In his
response to Pinker and Bloom, Charles
Catania claims that scientists heretofore have
been hampered in developing a convincing
evolutionary (selectionist) account of lan-
guage, because they "have not properly iden-
tified the functions served by language" 18—
and, in particular, have failed to realize that
the "communicative function did not shape
language in the [human] species." He offers
an alternative
candidate for the primary function of
language [that] is more fundamental
than that of communication: Language
is an efficient way to change another's
behavior. 19
Communication, according to Catania, is it-
self simply the sign of a deeper process; it
does indeed make an evolutionary differ-
ence, but only in that it is used by individu-
als to influence the behavior of other indi-
viduals. Language, as a social phenomenon,
"can emerge only in organisms whose be-
haviors are already sensitive to social con-
tingencies." 2U The key to the development
of language is the evolutionary necessity for
discrimination of behaviors (Can that ani-
mal be safely ignored or is it about to eat
me?). Discriminative capacities that en-
hance survival by seeking to shape or be
shaped by others' behavior in varying ways
under varying circumstances will be selected
for, and, Catania suggests, language is one
of these. That words mean is not so impor-
tant as
—
perhaps it is simply a by-product
of the fact—that words do.
Catania sketches a tentative evolution-
ary scenario based on his thesis, involving
at least two stages: ( 1 ) a leader of a group
("probably a dominant male" 21 ) maintain-
ing some sort of primitive verbal control over
the group's behavior, thus keeping the group
coordinated, giving it "a competitive edge,"
and so (assuming that the leader is repro-
ductively successful!) selecting for in-
creased verbal flexibility and complexity;
and (2) the leader's capacity for verbal be-
havior-shaping expression eventually being
replicated in successors and listeners by fur-
ther selection.
But how is this sort of behavior-influ-
encing behavior different from such things
as bird songs, monkey screeches, and bee
dances ? Or how, in this ancient population,
did behavior modification by verbal control
escape from the primitive "one-call/one-re-
sponse" correlation characteristic of nonhu-
man species? Here Catania makes a sheer
conceptual jump:
The increasing complexity of the
vocabulary and its contexts must reach
the point at which some calls occur in
combination, and their several forms
could then evolve further into verbs,
nouns, and various modifiers. 22
It seems, then, that increased grammatical
complexity is to be explained not by envi-
ronmental pressures—but by increased
grammatical complexity! Catania provides
no insight into how, if language is funda-
mentally and simply a tool for influencing
behavior, the uniquely and lushly developed,
arbitrarily extensible structure and sheer
range of cognitive and emotional and (not
least) behavior-shaping powers of human
language came about by means of natural
selection. In this case, again, the proposal
for language's function, while drawing at-
tention to one of its important dimensions,
falls short of illuminating its evolutionary
history.
Language as humanness
Derek Bickerton insists that there are
features of language that show clearly that
it was not designed for effective communi-
cation of propositions or exercise of power
at all. For example, in English (and in other
languages, particularly Creoles) the marker
for the relative clause is often optional. This
makes possible "garden path" sentences,
which start out by seeming perfectly intel-
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ligible—and then become apparent non-
sense. For example: The horse racedpast
the hari} fell. At first, the sentence's intui-
tive meaning seems clear: raced is the main
active verb. But when one gets to the word
fell, this "garden path" turns out to be a dead
end (assuming that the whole sentence is a
well-formed one). With a relative clause
marker, the intended meaning can be seen
more clearly: The horse that was racedpast
the barnfell [down]. However, despite the
possibility of misinterpretation, the marker
is not mandatory: the hook I bought is as
acceptable as the hook that I bought. Seem-
ingly arbitrary and potentially difficult-to-
parse features such as this, Bickerton
claims, makes language "quite impossible
to explain in terms of social, cultural, or
communicative benefits." 23 Indeed,
Bickerton's theory of language sees it not
as what must be explained in terms of puta-
tive "functional*' requirements and gradual
The manifold ways in which linguisti-
cally skilled brains interact with exter-
nal objects—including other brains—
as part of the story of evolution by
natural selection are understood, if at
all, only in coarse, and sometimes
conflicting, outlines.
evolution under various selective pressures,
but as what explains other human abilities
and generated new and powerful ways of
adapting. A single mutation, he proposes,
that created a previously nonexistent net-
work between previously unrelated brain
structures, gave rise to a "syntax machine"
that converted—within several genera-
tions—an ungrammatical, limited
"protolanguage" into the "superb and infi-
nitely flexible instrument that all of us con-
trol today." 24 Language, thus "stumbled
into," became the "single determining ca-
pacity" M—the basis of further selection
—
that permitted the development of distinc-
tively human intelligence, consciousness,
behavior, and culture. It is language that
defines humanness.26
This, of course, might be dismissed out
of hand as the ultimate "just-so" story. (How
did language come about? Just becauseY)
But Bickerton has effectively disposed of
the requirement of explaining language's
function—in an evolutionary sense—by dis-
carding the necessity of explaining
language's adaptation. In his view, lan-
guage has many "functions," 21 but the
"need" for these functions arose from the
preexisting capacity for language, not vice
versa. Yet there is a prior problem.
Bickerton's argument that language is not
an adaptation for communication or social
influence depends on its non-optimality
its lack of "good" design
for the putative function(s).
But, as Pinker and Bloom
point out, evolutionary sce-
narios are not always so re-
ducible: "Tradeoffs among
conflicting adaptive goals
are a ubiquitous limitation
on optimality in the design
of organisms." 2S While
they would preferably be
spelled out more plausibly,
it is still the case that there
might be many (both re-
peatable and non-repeatable) reasons that
language got "stuck" in certain aspects
blind alleys, local minima—in the course
of its development. As much as he rightly
emphasizes the uniqueness of human lan-
guage and underscores its importance in
forming, framing, and furthering human
thought, behavior, and potential, Bickerton
has not convincingly demonstrated that the
evolution of language cannot be accounted
for in terms of function.
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Theological Considerations
The proposals just outlined, and their
kin, however committed to remaining on the
level of "biology," find themselves inevita-
bly touching on aspects of the relation be-
tween the organism and its environment
—
representation, communication, cooperation,
competition, influence—on which it is still
difficult (though not necessarily impossible)
to get a purely biological handle. 29 The
manifold ways in which linguistically skilled
brains interact with external objects—in-
cluding other brains—as part of the story of
evolution by natural selection are under-
stood, if at all, only in coarse, and sometimes
conflicting, outlines. Evidently, the dis-
agreements over language's "function" do
not clearly lend themselves, at this point, to
purely biological resolution.
To take this line of thinking further, why
should the "environment" to which a popu-
lation of organisms (or one of their functional
characteristics) is putatively "adapting" be
limited to the physical world? 30 Often, of
course, it is seen as methodologically sus-
pect to invoke "supernatural," not to men-
tion theistic, descriptions or explanations for
phenomena that can
presence—indeed, the unavoidably intrusive
and conditioning presence—of God in and
to the world can be assumed 32 and the im-
plications of that assumption mined for their
possible contributions to (not definitive reso-
lutions of) ongoing debates on other levels.
I will pursue the experiment, then, by sum-
marizing tliree theologically motivated theo-
ries of language—in a rough progression. 33
Language as self-transcendence
Few theologians whose interests in-
clude anthropology have explicitly investi-
gated the theological implications of human
language as a biological phenomenon. One
prominent exception is Wolfhart
Pannenberg, who connects the development
of human language (in terms both of its ac-
quisition by individual children and of its
evolution in the species) with the symbolic
recognition and manipulation of objects
characteristic of human play behavior
(which opens the individual to the larger
world and finds its most complex manifes-
tation in myth and ritual) and, thereby, with
"the religious consciousness." 34 By this he
means the (usually unthematic) awareness
i
be accounted for
"perfectly well" on a
materialist basis.







counts ot reality may
be, to first order, complete in themselves and
still be subject to placement in a "hierarchy"
of "levels"—levels that are, in the final
analysis, not isolatable from each other and,
indeed, may influence one another pro-
foundly. 31 And religious adherents, Chris-
tians in particular, are not always in the po-
sition of having laboriously to justify their
belief in a reality beyond the visible. The
The presence—indeed, the unavoidably
intrusive and conditioning presence—of
God in and to the world can be assumed
and the implications of that assumption
minedfor their possible contributions to
(not definitive resolutions of) ongoing de-
bates on other levels.
of "totality," the limitless ground against
which we recognize and distinguish between
finite things, and which for Pannenberg (as,
in a different way, for Schleiermacher) func-
tions as an intimation of the infinite God. 35
Language, according to Pannenberg, con-
sists in a symbolic apprehension and repre-
sentation of things in the world whereby we
"open" ourselves self-transcendingly to our
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surroundings, placing ourselves, and that
which is not ourselves, in a "total" context.
Words carve out particular concepts and
objects that can only be understood against
their background:
Every statement about the meaning and
nature of a present reality looks beyond
what is presently at hand to its context,
in which alone the particular thing
acquires its due meaning. In this sense,
every word that names the nature of a
thing by assigning it its meaning gives
expression to something "hidden." 36
Moreover, language is used in conversa-
tion, in speaking within some sort of com-
Thus,for Pannenberg, language is more
than a toolfor communication or power;
it manifests the shared human openness
to a wider sphere that gives context and
meaning to that of which we speak.
jects—of the "world," then there must ex-
ist a ground against which the representa-
tional figures—in their diversified finite-
ness—can be distinguished and identified.
There are trenchant criticisms that can be
directed against the idea of language as ex-
clusively a system of representation. In-
deed, Pannenberg recognizes that language
is dynamic—that it is not a static system of
fixed associations but "is bound up with
'forms of life."' 39 And in that this dyna-
mism, this life, characterizes not individual
speakers and listeners, but the speaking and
listening community, pointers may be seen
m to the "whole" that al-
! lows recognition and dif-
ferentiation of the parts.
Language mediates our
openness to this "whole"
in a way that invites re-
flection on—and ulti-
mately relation to—the
widest sphere, the largest
horizon, of all: the infi-
nite and eternal God.
munity; and in speaking to one another we
find that conversations often have a di-
rected and dynamic "life" of their own,
transcending and encompassing the indi-
vidual speakers and pointing ultimately to
the "spirit of life as a totality," 37 the "field"
which is actually prior to and makes pos-
sible the existence of finite individual bear-
ers of life. 38
Thus, for Pannenberg, language is
more than a tool for communication or
power: it manifests the shared human open-
ness to a wider sphere that gives context
and meaning to that of which we speak. Of
course, no attempt at a neurobiological or
evolutionary account of the capacity for
representation that constitutes that open-
ness is being made here, only an unpack-
ing of the presuppositions that underlie the
concept of representation. If language in-
volves symbolic representation—a "seg-
mentation" into discrete concepts and ob-
Language as co-creation
In no normal usage, of course, does
"God" denote anything like "infinite ground
of meaning" or "eternal field of the fu-
ture"—an implicit limitation of theological
theories of language that involve only rep-
resentation. Perhaps one can go further. Al-
though Philip Hefner does not explicitly
mention language (in biological terms), his
treatment of culture and religion in the con-
text of an evolutionary perspective on hu-
man nature would seem to lend itself easily
to an extension to language. Hefner's
theory of the "created co-creator" attempts
to bring the particular picture of the world
drawn by modern science to bear on ques-
tions of the created order's purpose and
humanity's relation to, and responsibility
for, the rest of creation. The theory sees
human capacities (under the rubrics of
"freedom," referring to conditioned deci-
sions and their justifications, and of "cul-
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ture," referring to learned behaviors and
their interpretations) as the "instrumental-
ity" whereby God enables the whole cre-
ation to participate in the divine purposes.
Human beings, representing at their cur-
rent point of evolution "a new stage of free-
dom," have been assigned to play a critical
role in bringing creation to its fulfillment
—
its own "emergence" into freedom.40 Of
course, humanity has already—certainly
with ambiguous motives and results—ex-
tended its influence into an impressively
wide range of earthly environments.41 The
urgent task is now to modulate and grow
that influence wisely—toward "wholesome-
ness"
42
and "blessing." 43 Human cultural
systems, with their attendant myths and ritu-
als (now joined by scientific practice and
knowledge), provide the information nec-
essary to ensure productive congruence be-
tween the behavior of human beings and
their surroundings.
What function might language have,
given such an account of the world and
humanity's role? Hefner's flexible use of
the term "create" provides a clue. Certainly
human beings do not create in the way that
God does; but their status as "co-creators"
emphasizes (proceeding on analogy from
God's character as Creator) theirfree and
intentional activity. If human beings are
co-creators, then perhaps language is the
way in which the creation is defined—
a
defining that does not arise automatically
out of the creation's intrinsic nature but is
given it on the basis of free decision, and a
defining that is oriented toward, or cogni-
zant of, its puiposes in the context of God's
plan.
Nearly every element of the ecosystem
is defined... by the uses the human
sector has assigned to it. The very
continuation of the ecosystem is
significantly affected by Homo sapiens
and that creature's definition of itself
and of its world.44
Language, Hefner might say, is a way of es-
tablishing the world, not in an ontological,
ex nihilo sense, but as a sphere of respon-
sible and directed human action.
A precursor to this idea might be found
in the Yahwistic account of creation (Gen-
esis 2-3), in which God brings the animals
to the man in order that they might be
named:
So out of the ground the Lord God
formed every animal of the field and
every bird of the air, and brought them
to the man to see what he would call
them; and whatever the man called
every living creature, that was its name.
The man gave names to all cattle, and
to the birds of the air, and to every
animal of the field; but for the man
there was not found a helper as his
partner.
(Gen. 2:19-20)45
In his commentary on Genesis, Claus
Westermann writes of this passage:
The meaning is not, as most
interpreters think, that the man
acquires power over the animals by
naming them. ...[b]ut rather that the
man gives the animals their names
and thereby puts them into a place in
the world. ... By naming the animals
the man opens up, determines and
orders his world and incorporates
them into his life. The world
becomes human only through
language.46
Furthermore, the naming is purposeful: in
naming the animals, the man is pursuing
God's desire that he have a companion.
God brings the animals to the man: this
procession gives expression to the
intention of God in making the animals;
it implies that it is the man who finds
out and decides what sort of helper
corresponds to him.47
With such a concept of language, con-
sideration shifts from that of humanity's rep-
resentation of the world (and wider con-
texts) to that of humanity's active (free and
intentional) involvement with the world—and
with God. Yet this account still leaves the
link between naming and responsibility un-
clear. Why should it be that, when the world
has been "defined" by language, humanity's
"involvement" with the world on the basis
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of language is meant to be oriented toward
"wholesomeness" and "blessing" for all cre-
ation—instead of simply toward competitive
power and self-aggrandizement (as in the
Tower of Babel story. Genesis 1 1 )? There is
room for yet another step in seeking the theo-
logical significance of human language.
Language as moral engagement
This third step is taken, in vigorous
form, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. Taking his
cue from the speech-act g
theory initiated by J. L.
Austin, Wolterstorff
sees human speaking as
a way ofperforming ac-
tions—what Austin
called illocutionary




promising, and identifying. 48 The act of
speaking, that is, of uttering words—
a
locutionary act—may count as one of these
illocutionary acts.
And what is it, for one's performance of
one action to count as one's performance
of another? My own conviction is that
there is no more fundamental question
posed by human discourse than this.
How can it be that by uttering the little
word "Guilty," someone condemns
another to be shot at dawn? 44
Wolterstorff states explicitly that "speech
actions are not, in their nature, a species of
exerting influence over someone [pace
Catania], nor a species of communicating or
expressing one's inner states" 50 (pace Pinker
and Bloom). Instead, he suggests, speak-
ing—using language—is the taking of a po-
sition, vis-a-vis one's fellow persons, in
which one has acquired certain "rights and
duties." To speak is "to take up a normative
stance in the public domain." 51 The func-
tion of language, for Wolterstorff, is intrin-
sically bound up with issues of moral ac-
countability—indeed, language is a way of
establishing and defining moral accountabil-
ity. A speech act, given normal circum-
stances and all other things being equal,
places the speaker under certain obliga-
tions—to tell the truth, to keep the promise,
and so on—and the hearer(s) under certain
obligations as well—to answer the request,
to heed the warning, and so on. Of course,
illocutionary acts may in fact, for a variety
of reasons and under a variety of circum-
stances, fail or be undermined, so that the
Moral subjectivity isformed in commu-
nal and narrative mode, and Wolterstorff
might agree with the thesis that the social
dynamic of language is at least partly
constitutive of the development ofhuman
identity in a moral environment.
normative standings that would have other-
wise been assigned do not "take." Still,
Wolterstorff insists, the fundamental texture
of human language, human speech action, is
moral and ethical, and that texture qualifies
our relation to the rest of creation: "By the
acquisition of normative standings, we take
up the material world into our service." 52
Pannenberg criticizes speech-act theory,
though not specifically Wolterstorff 's use of
it, on the grounds that language has prima-
rily to do with the representation of mean-
ing and only secondarily with achieving
ends—that is, with performing actions. In-
deed, since the concept of "action" requires
an acting subject, and since human subjec-
tivity—in terms of the unity of the ego, the
"I"—is only formed in time through the pro-
cess of living, "it is presumptuous for indi-
viduals to want to produce the whole of life
by their own action." 53 As mentioned al-
ready, Pannenberg maintains that such phe-
nomena as conversations—which depend on
"an object of shared interest that creates a
common ground and therefore communica-
tion" 54 and then go on to take "a life of [their]
The Boston Theological Institute 45
own" 55—show that language, far from
providing a basis on which we might be
"sovereignly" acting subjects, lifts us out
of ourselves into the unpredictable realm
of the "spirit." This might be true, as far as
it goes, but actually fails to come to grips
with Wolterstorff 's particular use of the
speech-act concept. For to take up a "nor-
mative stance" in the public domain is not
—
as the words themselves might unfortu-
nately suggest—to pit one's atomistically
and previously defined subjectivity over
against the world; rather, it is to accept an
essentially intersubjective and historical
construal of one's identity—as related to
God and to others in the story of one's life.
Moral subjectivity is formed in communal
and narrative mode, and Wolterstorff might
agree with the thesis that the social dynamic
of language is at least partly constitutive of
the development of human identity in a
moral environment.
Biological Language in a Theological
Environment
What these various theological propos-
als, building on one another, have in com-
mon is the idea that M
language reflects I
shared human relat-
edness not just with |
conspecifics or the j
natural order, but also 1
and fundamentally




digmatic creator and j
definer, and the j
source of moral '
norms. Under consideration here, undoubt-
edly, are notions such as "representation"
and "relation," that have been greatly ex-
tended beyond their normal biological uses.
Have they been stretched too far? Has biol-
ogy simply been left behind? Is the appar-
ent tension between seeing language as God-
directed and language as an adaptive prod-
uct of natural selection insurmountable?
What possible relation could theological
(Jerusalem) have with biological (Athens)
theories of language?
The findings to this point may be sum-
marized, somewhat aphoristically. If lan-
guage is adaptive communication (Pinker
and Bloom), then the representation implicit
in that communication points toward the
shared world and beyond to an infinite basis
of meaning (Pannenberg). If language is
adaptive power (Catania), then the direction
of linguistic influence toward specific tar-
gets presupposes the intentional linguistic
"creation" of a world in which targets ex-
ist—a co-creation possible because of the
original Creator (Hefner). If language is the
basis of adaptive humanness (Bickerton),
then "humanness" involves the moral
agency—ultimately vis-a-vis God—estab-
lished by language (Wolterstorff). Of course
these statements, as they stand, are much too
definitive. A great deal of elaboration would
be required to establish the suggested con-
nections on firmer ground. But even in
rough form they may provide a suitable
In orderfor a character to be an adapta-
tion, its function must confer, or contribute
to conferring, an increased probability of
survival and reproduction. Does a relation
to God increase the probability of survival
and reproduction? The answer is by no
means intuitively obvious.
backdrop for some issues arising from this
attempt at convergence between biological
and theological theories of language.
Questions about representation
In the first place, it would seem that
more sophistication is called for in the use
of the idea of "representation." To repeat the
basic question: How does the connection
—
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fundamental to language—between an ob-
ject or concept in the "world" (or an internal
state!) and its "symbol" as a word or sen-
tence arise? At first glance, it would seem
straightforwardly unproblematic to construe
language, as Pinker and Bloom do, as a mat-
ter of symbolic representation. But this is a
non-trivial biological question that, as has
been noted, opens up important philosophi-
cal and theological implications in multiple
directions. On the one hand, it is not at all
easy to state precisely—even in principle
—
how representation might be "done" in the
brain and therefore how it might have "de-
veloped" through natural selection. 56 More
work needs to be done here. On the other
hand, the very concept of linguistic repre-
sentation—when pressed to its logical con-
clusion—seems to lead to the threshold of a
territory where theistic assumptions and
"God-talk" no longer seem foreign, and
where that which is represented is necessar-
ily a dynamically social world that tran-
scends and contextualizes the individual user
of language. The "environment" in which
"representation" is taking place may have
dimensions as yet unexplored in standard
evolutionary biology.
Representation as an aspect of the func-
tion of language can hardly be dispensed
with. But, while the idea of representation
is essential, it is not perforce the only way
available of thinking about language. Thus,
a further task: for a more adequate theory,
the idea of representation must be integrated,
biologically and theologically, with other
means of construing language.57
Questions about adaptation
Secondly, if the "function" of language
involves human relatedness to God, then the
concept of "adaptation" itself, at least in this
connection, is open to challenge. In order
for a character to be an adaptation, classi-
cally considered, its function must confer.
or contribute to conferring, an increased
probability of survival and reproduction.
Does a relation to God increase the prob-
ability of survival and reproduction? The
answer is by no means intuitively obvious
—
at least on the Christian account of God,
which sees relatedness to the God of Jesus
Christ as potentially involving commitments
and behaviors that decidedly do not foster
survival and reproduction. If, indeed, in lan-
guage may be found—even from its evolu-
tionary beginnings—human beings' self-
transcending openness to God, their defini-
tion of the world in accordance with God's
purposes, and/or their acquisition of moral
rights and duties before God and each other,
as well as their capacity to communicate
propositions or influence behavior or gen-
erate culture, then the concept of evolution-
ary adaptation could well be more complex
and less unambiguous than might at first be
supposed.
Controversy remains over the primacy
of adaptation as a driving force of evolution
and of the adaptationist "stance" in evaluat-
ing biological data from an evolutionary per-
spective. 58 A wider context for this debate
can yet be imagined. If the "struggle for sur-
vival" is not the last word on earthly exist-
ence, if the often painful and deadly contests
among genes, organisms, and populations
that seem endemic to the biological drama
can validly be interpreted in the light of the
assertion that "the creation waits with eager
longing for the revealing of the children of
God; for the creation was subjected to futil-
ity, not of its own will but by the will of the
one who subjected it. in hope that the cre-
ation itself will be set free from its bondage
to decay and will obtain the freedom of the
glory of the children of God," 59 then the cen-
trality of adaptation as a feature of the his-
tory of life is dramatically relativized. After
tracing part of the history of the debate over
adaptation. Burian points out that
the deep and complex biological issues
that occasioned the debate remain: does
selection operate at many levels,
producing many levels of adaptations?
If so. how does this affect the nature of
adaptive processes and of adaptations? ftn
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The question can be recast in the light of the
relationship to God manifested by language:
What "processes" other than (and not always
and necessarily opposed to) selection oper-
ate at different levels, producing many lev-
els of effects, including but decisively not
limited to adaptation? 61
Questions about ethics
Thirdly, if language—even as an evo-
lutionary phenomenon—reflects our stand-
ing (and acting) as moral agents, then per-
haps this is a sign that morality is an irre-
ducible aspect of the nature of reality and
must be taken into account, not simply by
explaining it away in terms of evolutionary
advantage and adaptation (for example) but
as part andparcel of those concepts. 62 I will
not repeat the symphony of arguments con-
ducted by Murphy and Ellis, for example,
against the possibility of "reducing" ethics
to anything else. Instead, I will engage
Dennett's claim that the only realistic and
potentially productive account of morality
is based not ultimately on the character of
God and God's word, but on reason and na-
ture—that is, on a picture of the world
painted from a strictly evolutionary palette.
As Darwinian thinking gets closer and
close to home—where we live
—
tempers run higher, and the rhetoric
tends to swamp the analysis. But
sociobiologists, beginning with Hobbes
and continuing through Nietzsche to
the present day. have seen that only an
evolutionary analysis of the origins
—
and transformations—of ethical norms
could ever properly make sense of
them. ... Ethical decision-making,
examined from the perspective of
Darwin's dangerous idea, holds out
scant hope of our ever discovering a
formula or an algorithm for doing right.
But that is not an occasion for despair;
we have the mind-tools we need to
design and redesign ourselves, ever
searching for better solutions to the
problems we create for ourselves and
others. 63
Dennett scorns appeals to a nonexist-
ent God, or the Bible, or other sacred texts
or traditions, for morally authoritative judg-
ments, and subsequently finds that his pre-
ferred brand of evolutionary "realism" pro-
vides a context for tracing the development
and interrelationships of various ethical sys-
tems—but no firm basis for moral authority
of any kind, except, perhaps, that which can
be expressed in terms of "solutions" to
"problems" found by "mind-tools." Lan-
guage, of course, is among the needed
"mind-tools," whose emergence presented
to human beings
a technology that created a whole new
class of objects-to-contemplate,
verbally embodied surrogates that
could be reviewed in any order at any
pace. And this opened up a new
dimension of self-improvement—all
one had to do was learn to savor one's
own mistakes. 64
With the tool one can accomplish, or at-
tempt to accomplish, the task—even if part
of that task involves the use of "conversa-
tion-stoppers," 65 arbitrary rules that squelch
moral debate in favor of decisive action.
But if language is itselfaform ofmoral en-
gagement, then the task has been started
even before the tool has been picked up. If
by speaking we posit and take normative
stances in the public domain, then in so do-
ing we are not, in the first place, defining
or debating moral norms: we are submit-
ting to preexisting norms and being our-
selves directed, communally and authori-
tatively, by them. Whence arise those
norms (or standards or conventions)? It
would be beyond the scope of this paper to
demonstrate (if it were possible) that the
most parsimonious "answer," with the most
explanatory power, to that question is
"God"; but persistent proposals to the con-
trary still fail to convince.
Language and Trinitarian Life
The—however "adaptive" or otherwise
—
relatedness to human beings, to the rest of cre-
ation, and to the Creator reflected in language
finds much deeper resonance in the distinc-
tively Christian vision of God. For the God
worshipped by the followers of Jesus Christ
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is self-revealed as constituted by self-giving
relatedness,66 by the "mutual interiority" of the
persons known to us as Father, Son, and
Spirit." And in the Biblical testimonies the
(economic, and by extension ontological) re-
lationships among the Trinitarian persons are
imaged in terms of their speaking with one
another and with others. 68 God's unsurpass-
able presence—indeed, indwelling—with hu-
manity, in fulfillment of the ancient promises,
is described, famously, as the Word.69
And, finally, the eschatological commu-
nity is portrayed in terms of (inter alia)
never-ending praise. 11 ' Might it not be com-
pelling to take up the suggestion that human
language provides a faint analog of the rich-
ness of the divine life—or, more properly,
that the divine life is imaged when human
community is established through language?
But now you must get rid of all such
things—anger, wrath, malice, slander,
and abusive language from your mouth.
Do not lie to one another, seeing that
you have stripped off the old self with
its practices and have clothed yourselves
with the new self, which is being
renewed in knowledge according to the
image of its creator. In that renewal
there is no longer Greek and Jew,
circumcised and uncircumcised,
barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but
Christ is all and in all!
(Col. 3:8-11)
To whatever extent evolutionary theory
provides a faithful description of the history
of life on Earth (or elsewhere), language is
surely an element of that story, subject to
the same constraints, instantiated in the same
physical, chemical, and neural "wetware"
that provides the substrate for other biologi-
cal capacities and phenomena. But the
"functionality" of language transcends its
place in the biological framework, and would
(whether the encounter be resisted, ignored,
and derided, or welcomed and celebrated)
take those who speak into the presence of
the living God.
The heavens are telling the glory of God;
and the Firmament proclaims God's
handiwork.
Day to day pours forth speech,
and night to night declares
knowledge.
There is no speech, nor are there words;
their voice is not heard;
yet their voice goes out through all the
earth,
and their words to the end of the
world.
Let the words of my mouth and the
meditation of my heart
be acceptable to you,
O Lord, my rock and my redeemer.
(Ps. 19:1-4, 14)
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Endnotes:
1. Randomly: "In our time philosophy
'has concerned itself with language as never
before in its history'" (Pannenberg, Anthro-
pology in Theological Perspective, p. 340,
quoting E. Heintel). "Modem philosophy is
dominated by a concern with language"
(Blackburn, p. v). "One of the central con-
cerns in contemporary theology and biblical
studies has been the interest in linguistics
and hermeneutics" (J. B. Torrance, in his
foreword to Thiselton, p. xi).
2. Enthusiastically: "The science of
language... has seen spectacular advances
in the years since [the birth of the field of
cognitive science J. There are many
phenomena of language that we are
coming to understand nearly as well as we
understand how a camera works or what
the spleen is for" (Pinker, p. 17). The real
story is somewhat more complicated, as I
hope to make clear.
3. See Peters; Murphy and Ellis.
4. It should be noted that I am here
presupposing neither commitment nor
opposition to the proposal that natural
selection is the explanatory principle of the
history of life. The thesis has great
strengths. But the eagerness with which
some writers on evolution seize on the
"power" of purely natural selection to
"explain" complexity and (apparent)
design—and thus exclude theistic view-
points (Dawkins; Dennett)—is more than a
little naive. The concept of "explanation"
itself deserves a more nuanced and
sophisticated treatment than it suffers at
the hands of such authors (cf., e.g.,
Swinburne).
5. Pinker and Bloom, p. 708.
6. Ibid., p. 709; emphasis in the original.
7. Ibid.; emphasis added.
8. Whatever that substrate might be and
however it might work, the details of
which are by no means clear.
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9. West-Eberhard, p. 13, where
"fitness" simply means a comparatively
better ability to exist long enough to
reproduce.
10. Pinker and Bloom, p. 726.
11. Dennett, p. 197. Emphasis in the
original.
12. Pinker gives a popularly oriented
(and at points optimistically speculative)
summary of the neuroscience. And yet,
concisely: "What is [still] pretty much a
mystery at this point is how linguistic
rules and representations are neurally
instantiated—that is, how physical
structure in the brain could make possible
the combinatorial regularities discovered
by linguistic research. In fact, other than
certain aspects of low-level vision, I know
of no success at relating systematicities of
mental representation to the details of
neural architecture" (Jackendoff, pp. 737-
738). Actually, it is not clear how even
exhaustive knowledge of the neurophysi-
ology of language would affect an
estimate of its function, biological or
otherwise.
13. Pinker and Bloom, p. 712; emphasis
added.
14. Ibid.
15. See the commentaries accompanying
Pinker and Bloom.
16. Bickerton, p. 73.
17. Deacon provides a slightly more
daring reading of the relation between
biology and symbolic representation,
suggesting that the representational
power of language could only arise with
the development of the prefrontal cortex,
which goes beyond making direct
correlations between external (environ-
mental) stimuli and internal brain states
to engage in "higher-order sequential or
hierarchic associations" among brain
areas (p. 665). But how do interactions
between brain areas give rise to sym-
bols? As indicated above, our ignorance
about how things work makes our
"stories" about how things got to be the
way they are dangerously Kipling-like
("just-so"). Some of the difficulties,
often blithely ignored, associated with
coming up with a plausible account of
the evolution of representation are nicely
summarized by Deacon (pp. 667-668).
From a different direction, Hacker asks
some salutary—though not insoluble
—
questions about the usually unmentioned
subjects of the alleged "representations,"
"mappings," and "encodings" and
"decodings" that are supposed to be
going on inside the brain. Who or what
is doing all this work—and according to
whose conventions?
18. Catania, p. 730.
19. Ibid.; emphasis added.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 731.
22. Ibid.
23. Bickerton, p. 37.
24. Ibid., p. 85.
25. Ibid., p. 7.
26. Bickerton's idea here shows parallels
to Jaynes's suggestion that consciousness
and culture are the consequences and not
the prerequisites of language: "Each new
stage of words literally created new
perceptions and attentions, and such new
perceptions and attentions resulted in
important cultural changes which are
reflected in the archaeological record" (p.
132). A similar concept is described, more
graphically, by Dennett, in his metaphor of
the "Tower of Generate-and-Test," which
arranges organisms hierarchically accord-
ing to their ability to foresee consequences
and plan strategies for their future actions.
"There is one more embodiment of that
wonderful idea, and it is the one that gives
our minds their greatest power: once we
have language—a bountiful kit of mind-
tools—we can use these tools in the
structure of deliberate, foresightful
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generate-and-test known as science. All
the other varieties of generate-and-test are
willy-nilly" (p. 380).
27. Bickerton, p. 11.
28. Pinker and Bloom, p. 7 17.
29. See the various contributions to
Keller and Lloyd for the ongoing struggles
to make biological "sense" of some of
these concepts, as well as others such as
"altruism," "fitness," and "progress."
30. Cf. Jenson's caustic invocation of
the concept: "A theologian already must
have some problem with this phrase:
'adaptation' to what? If our culture's
standard association of terms is to be
followed, 'adaptation' is to the 'environ-
ment,' a term devised on purpose to
bracket out the reality of God" (p. 117).
31. See Muiphy and Ellis.
32. See Plantinga.
33. Perhaps in parallel with what some
see as the historical shift from "modern" to
"postmodern" theories of language (see
Muiphy).
34. Pannenberg, Anthropology in
Theological Perspective, p. 361.
35. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology,
Volume 1.
36. Pannenberg, Anthropology in
Theological Perspective, p. 395.
37. Ibid., p. 376.
38. Robert Jenson's interpretation of
language is similar in form, although he
prefers to emphasize the temporal dimen-
sion: "Language is the location of our
openness to the future. It is only because
reality is not there for us in its brute self
merely, but is there for us in our words to
each other about it, is there interpreted and
so interpretable, that the world as it has
come to be is not final for us, that we are
able to will and evoke what is not yet"
(Jenson, p. 56). Thus the open, yet-to-be,
boundless "field" of the future is the
context that gives meaning to words.
Further, also in line with Pannenberg,
Jenson finds that language posits a
communal and historical world: "By our
words to each other, by our mutual address
and response, we create a shared life, a life
that is neither just my life, or your life, but
our life. In that shared life, what comes
from you is to me a new possibility, a new
future, just in those ways in which you are
in fact different from me" (Jenson, p. 41).
See Pannenberg, Systematic Theology,
Volume 2; Welker.
39. Muiphy, p. 114.
40. Hefner, p. 32.
41. Hefner has relatively little to say
about the rest of the (non-earthly) cosmos,
and what he does say is vague and
unfocused. What, for example, is the
significance of humanity's "stretching"
activity (p. 47), Hefner's metaphor for
cultural development considered together
with its effects in the terrestrial context,
on, or from the perspective of, a quasar 15
billion light-years distant?
42. Hefner, p. 155.
43. Ibid., p. 237.
44. Ibid., p. 119.
45. All scriptural citations are from the
Bible, New Revised Standard Version.
46. Westermann, pp. 228-229.
47. Ibid., p. 228.
48. Austin, pp. 98-99.
49. Wolterstorff, p. 78.
50. Ibid., p. 75.
51. Ibid., p. 93.
52. Ibid.
53. Pannenberg, Anthropology in
Theological Perspective, p. 367.
54. Ibid., p. 370.
55. Ibid., p. 372.
56. See Hacker. Cf. Kanerva for one
among many mathematically rigorous
attempts to outline a "theory" of memory
that merely ignores the problem of how
sequences of binary digits or collocations
of adjustable synaptic weights might mean
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concepts, propositions, feelings, or
experiences.
57. See Murphy.
58. See Burian; West-Eberhard. The
phenomenon of altruism retains its
premier rank among "problems" for
evolutionary theorists (see the relevant
sections of Keller and Lloyd; Dennett;
Hefner; and Murphy and Ellis)—not in the
sense that it is an insoluble barrier to
selectionist accounts that depend on the
force and ubiquity of competition (the
"struggle for survival"), but in that
construing it consistently as an adaptation
brings to light numerous ambiguities,
conceptual slippages, and odd implica-
tions that are still being debated and
worked through.
59. Rom. 8:19-21.
60. Burian, p. 12.
61. Of course, another question can be
asked from the reverse direction: If
relatedness to God is in some way (or
various ways) an inescapable aspect of
human existence, then can one speak
intelligibly of neurobiological substrates
for that relatedness? What is happening in
our brains when we pray? Perhaps
nothing "special"—but as yet our answer
must still be ignorant, if curious, silence.
62. Murphy and Ellis.
63. Dennett, pp. 493, 510.
64. Ibid., p. 380.
65. Ibid., p. 506.
66. See Moltmann.
67. Volf, p. 128.
68. For example, Matt. 4:16-17, Luke
10:21-22, John 17, Acts 13:2.
69. John 1, Heb. 1:1-3. "In the mind of
the theologian of the Prologue [to the
fourth Gospel] the creative word of God,
the word of the Lord that came to the
prophets, has become personal in Jesus
who is the embodiment of divine revela-
tion" (Brown, p. 524).
70. Revelation, passim.
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